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Abstract
Constructing an original panel on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) in pesticides
for 50 countries over 2006-2012, this paper studies the eﬀect of heterogeneity in MRL
regulation on bilateral trade. We ﬁnd evidence of regulatory heterogeneity diminishing
trade at the extensive margin when the exporter faces more stringent regulation abroad,
suggesting compliance costs in entering the destination market. Signiﬁcantly, however,
we also ﬁnd strong evidence of regulatory heterogeneity increasing trade at the intensive
margin for exports coming from countries that set the strictest standards, alluding to
the positive informative eﬀect of such regulation.
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1 Introduction
The continual decline of tariﬀs through successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations
has increased the relative importance of non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs). Sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) standards and technical barriers to trade (TBT) are two such NTMs, which
though imposed for legitimate reasons, can also be instruments of disguised protectionism.
Standards prescribe requirements for product characteristics, production processes and/or
conformity assessment to address information problems, market failure externalities and so-
cietal concerns. However, country-speciﬁc standards eﬀectively create additional costs for
foreign producers by forcing them to adjust their product and production process so as to
meet individual national standards. Further costs emanate from the need for subsequent con-
formity assessment with these standards (for instance see Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Baldwin
et al., 2000; Chen and Mattoo, 2008; Chen et al., 2006).
Public and private standards for food imports continue to diﬀer between countries despite
international coordination, development of multilateral regulations and common conformity
assessments by international institutions. Such heterogeneity in standards creates two main
negative side eﬀects. One, foreign producers are hurt by the increased production and trans-
action costs that emanate from the requirement to meet diﬀerent regulations in diﬀerent
markets. Such costs may even become prohibitive and are especially burdensome for devel-
oping countries trying to access developed country markets. Two, by creating uncertainty
about changing regulations, heterogeneous country-speciﬁc standards have a negative eﬀect
on productive eﬃciency by preventing ﬁrms from being able to take advantage of economies
of scale. When markets remain segmented by such asymmetries, ﬁrms are also able to
raise mark-ups, implying less allocative eﬃciency than could be reached with homogeneous
standards.
Additionally, Baldwin et.al. (2000) point to a magniﬁcation eﬀect of globalization: the
greater the freeness of trade, the greater the eﬀect of any remaining barriers especially from
an economic geography point of view. In other words, a reduction in distortion arising from
tariﬀ barriers, will lead to an increased impact of regulatory diﬀerences on the location of
production. (Baller, 2007)
Heterogeneity in regulations and standards also implies additional costs for the government,
as SPS authorities need to provide support to the export sector to meet diﬀerent standards in
diﬀerent markets. Finally, regulatory heterogeneity has also led to greater negotiations costs
and a possible "stumbling block" eﬀect on the multilateral trading system by generating
the need for bilateral/plurilateral negotiations with one's most important trading partners,
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especially those with more stringent standards. SPS Chapters are a "standard" feature of
all post-2000 trade agreements, including the ongoing TPP and TTIP negotiations.
A commonly used standard in agricultural products restricts the maximum residue level
(MRL) from pesticides. A pesticide residue is a tiny trace of pesticide that sometimes
remains on the treated crop. An MRL is the maximum amount of residue legally permitted
on food products. Once residues are demonstrated to be safe for consumption, MRLs are set
by independent scientists, based on rigorous evaluation of each legally authorized pesticide.
Countries choose the products they regulate, the pesticides they regulate for each product,
as well as the MRL for a given product-pesticide pair.
In this paper, we examine the eﬀect of heterogeneity in MRL regulation on bilateral trade
using original data on pesticide MRLs over 2006-2012 for 50 countries (details in Section
4.2).
In doing so, we make several original empirical contributions to the impact assessment of
standards literature. We assemble an original panel on pesticide MRLs and bilateral trade
ﬂows to investigate the eﬀects for agri-trade both on the probability of exporting and on the
value of exports. We construct two indices of regulatory heterogeneity, which departing from
existing literature, also examine the eﬀect of heterogeneity on exports when the exporting
country is bound to stricter regulation at home than in the destination market. Other studies
analyzing the eﬀect of sanitary measures on trade either assume no eﬀect from regulatory
dissimilarity when the exporter is stricter (Burnquist et al., 2011) or that all regulation
heterogeneity leads to compliance costs for the exporter in the destination market, whether
or not regulations are stricter in the exporter market (Achterbosch et al., 2009; Drogué
and DeMaria, 2012; Winchester et al., 2012). Finally, our analyses are based on a more
comprehensive product-pesticide coverage (118 products and 1193 pesticides) compared to
previous work on agricultural trade in this literature1, which studies the eﬀects of standards
on one product, one pesticide, one product-pesticide pair or at best, few selected products-
pesticides pair.
We ﬁnd evidence in our empirical results of trade reduction at the extensive margin due
to MRL regulatory heterogeneity when the importer has stricter regulation, suggesting that
the exporter has to absorb compliance costs to enter the destination market. More striking
though, is the evidence that diﬀerences in MRL standards have a strong and persistent posi-
tive eﬀect at the intensive margin for exports coming from countries with stricter regulation,
alluding to the positive signalling eﬀect of the latter.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews the existing
1The following section provides a detailed review of the existing literature.
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literature while Section 3 describes the measures of heterogeneity we construct, comparing
them with others that have been proposed in this literature. Section 4 presents the empirical
methodology and data used to estimate the trade eﬀects of MRL regulation heterogeneity,
with results discussed in Section 5 before concluding.
2 Literature review
The main strand of the standards-literature has generally been more concerned with the link
between standards and innovation and standards and growth. The link between harmoniza-
tion of standards and trade has generated academic and research interest only in the last
decade.
Even so, most work is empirical in nature and theoretical literature on this subject remains
scant. Ganslandt and Markusen (2001) have modeled TBTs formally (though not their
liberalization). Baldwin et al. (2000) and Chen and Mattoo (2008) have modeled both TBTs
and their harmonization, cautioning against the discriminatory eﬀects that the latter may
entail.
The empirical analysis in Chen and Mattoo (2008) focused on harmonization directives and
mutual recognition initiatives in manufacturing industries in a sample of 42 OECD and
developing countries over 1986-2001. They found these to raise both intra-regional trade
as well as trade with excluded developed countries, though their results also indicated that
such harmonization diverted trade away from developing countries.
Other work on diverging standards in the manufacturing sector included: Moenius (2006)
who estimated the eﬀects of importer-/exporter-speciﬁc and internationally harmonized stan-
dards on trade between Canada and its major trading partners in electricity-dependent prod-
ucts over 1980-1995 for 471 four-digit SITC industries; Baller (2007) who examined trade
eﬀects of the regional liberalization of TBTs for testing procedures in telecoms and medical
devices; and Shepherd (2007), who used a new database of EU product standards in the
textiles, clothing and footwear sectors to show that international standards harmonization
is associated with increased partner country export variety. All these studies found a neg-
ative impact of regulatory heterogeneity on trade, especially for exporters from low income
countries.
Moving away from studies on the manufacturing sector, de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006)
studied the trade eﬀects of harmonization of food regulations in the EU on intra-EU trade
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in food products over 1990-2001 by considering harmonization initiatives in EC Directives.
They found this harmonization to have a large and positive eﬀect on import intensity both
at the aggregate level and for individual food sectors. The authors not only use very diﬀerent
data from us, but they also only investigate intra-EU trade eﬀects and only at the intensive
margin.
Achterbosch et al. (2009) studied the impact of diﬀerences in pesticide MRLs on Chilean
fruits exports to the EU15 over 1996-2007 and found a 5% reduction in the EU's regulatory
tolerance levels for MRLs to lead to a 14.8% decline in export volumes, with grapes being
twice as sensitive as the other fruits. Our focus is also on MRL harmonization, but unlike
Achterbosch et al. (2009), we include all agriculture and processed food sectors, a wider
sample of trading partners and also study the extensive margin of trade.
Melo et al. (2014) examined regulatory harmonization in a range of SPS and quality (SPSQ)
measures (including MRLs) on Chilean fresh fruit exports in 16 destination markets based
on the number of regulations and exporters perception of the stringency of SPSQ measures
over 2005-09. However, their research design, methodology and country focus are completely
diﬀerent from ours.
The papers closest to ours are Winchester et al. (2012) and Drogué and DeMaria (2012).
Winchester et al. (2012) study the impact of regulatory heterogeneity on the EU's agri-food
export intensity in the year 2009-10 by using the NTM -Impact database that was assembled
under a European research framework programme. Their results indicate that diﬀerences
in most regulations weakly reduce trade, but that stricter MRLs for plant products in one
country relative to others reduces exports to that country. Unlike Winchester et al. (2012),
we only focus on MRLs in pesticides in our paper but this enables us to include more products
and trading partners and also give a panel dimension to our analysis, which is also conducted
at both margins of trade.
Drogué and DeMaria (2012) construct an alternative index of regulatory heterogeneity in
MRLs (following that in Vigani et al., 2010) to examine its eﬀect on bilateral export intensity
of fresh and processed apples and pears among 40 trading partners over 2000-09. Once again,
our paper is diﬀerent from theirs along several dimensions  sample, heterogeneity index and
treatment of margins of trade.
Finally, a contemporaneous paper by Ferro et al. (2013) uses the same data on pesticide
MRLs as ours to study the eﬀects of standards restrictiveness on agri-exports in importing
countries over 2006-11. Like us, the authors ﬁnd more restrictive standards in the destination
market to advsersely aﬀect the probability of exporting, but unlike us, they do not consider
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the case where the exporting country has more stringent regulation. Our heterogeneity index
is also diﬀerent from their measure of standards restrictiveness.
Since one original contribution of this paper is our use of two measures of regulatory het-
erogeneity, we devote the next section to describing how we construct our measures and to
contrasting them with the other measures used in the reviewed literature.
3 Measures of MRL regulation heterogeneity
Drogué and DeMaria (2012) use a similarity index based on the Pearson correlation co-
eﬃcient which is the covariance of two random variables divided by the product of their
standard deviations. The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is then subtracted from 1 to create
the "respective distance" ranging between 0 (very similar) and 2 (very diﬀerent). This ap-
proach however speaks only of the linear relationship between the two MRL regulations and
does not consider diﬀerences in levels: two countries might have perfectly collinear regulation
but at diﬀerent levels, thus having a similarity index of 0 and yet be very diﬀerent in terms
of stringency.
Moreover, the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient could be sensitive to outliers (which Drogué and
DeMaria (2012) remove by ﬁxing a maximum level in their data for MRLs) and to skewness of
the random variables2, which is a problem since the distribution of MRL regulation are highly
positively (right) skewed. Furthermore, they do not distinguish the eﬀect that heterogeneity
of regulation can have depending on whether it is the importer or the exporter that is stricter.
In other words, they assume that all dissimilarity implies compliance, even when exporting
to a less stringent market than your own. Their results foreshadow a probable need to
diﬀerentiate as they don't ﬁnd that "regulatory distance does not per se impede trade. The
values of the marginal eﬀects of the interaction term between the similarity index and the
exporting countries ﬁxed eﬀects are more ambiguous" (Drogué and DeMaria, 2012).
The heterogeneity index in Winchester et al. (2012) is based on the Gower index of similarity3
which has three particularities : i) the dissimilarity measure is scaled by the maximum
dissimilarity between all countries considered; ii) it assumes that compliance costs arise
even when the exporter has stricter standards; and iii) it allows for the comparison of binary,
ordered and quantitative measures. The third point is interesting for their paper since they
consider multiple standards (not only MRLs) which are not quantitatively measured like
2Kowalski (1972)
3Gower (1971)
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MRLs. The two former points however, make their index uninteresting for our approach; we
see no reason for scaling the bilateral dissimilarity by the largest possible dissimilarity across
countries since it confuses the interpretation of results in our opinion, and we believe that
heterogeneity has asymmetric eﬀects on trade depending on which of the trading partners is
stricter.
Burnquist et al. (2011) build on Winchester et al. (2012) by introducing a modiﬁed version of
their Heterogeneity Index of Trade with an Actual Heterogeneity Index which only considers
cases in which the importer is stricter. In other words, to deal with the criticism that the
dissimilarity might not produce compliance costs for stringent exporters they set the index
at 0 (very similar).
The index in Achterbosch et al. (2009) is constructed by taking the diﬀerence in MRL
regulation and normalizing it through the division of the sum of the levels in both countries.
Following Achterbosch et al. (2009), we construct a heterogeneity index of MRLs as follows:
rijpkt =
MRLjpkt −MRLipkt
MRLjpkt +MRLipkt
(1)
The index, r, measures the degree of heterogeneity of MRL regulation between importer i
and exporter j, regarding the maximum residue level of pesticide k allowed to remain on
product p. The value of the index ranges between -1 and 1, where r = 0 indicates that
for the same pesticide and crop, the importer and exporter have equal MRLs and there is
therefore no heterogeneity.
Negative values of the index imply that for the country-pair product-pesticide combination,
the exporter is stricter than the importer. The opposite is true when the index value is
positive (see Figure 1). Because the main concern about these sanitary measures is that
they create signiﬁcant compliance costs for exporting countries irrespective of the source of
such costs, we will test this claim by separating the index into two indices: f and m, the
former corresponding to heterogeneity emanating from cases in which the importer has more
stringent regulation, and the latter to cases in which the exporter is more stringent.
fijpkt =

MRLjpkt−MRLipkt
MRLjpkt+MRLipkt
if MRLjpkt > MRLipkt
0 otherwise
(2)
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mijpkt =

MRLjpkt−MRLipkt
MRLjpkt+MRLipkt
if MRLjpkt < MRLipkt
0 otherwise
(3)
The value of f is positive (importer more restrictive) or zero, while that of m is negative (ex-
porter more restrictive) or zero. This distinguishes us from the approach of simply ignoring
heterogeneity when the exporter is stricter (Burnquist et al., 2011) and from the approach
that heterogeneity always imposes compliance costs (Achterbosch et al., 2009; Drogué and
DeMaria, 2012; Winchester et al., 2012).
If we consider our index F, a strong negative eﬀect at the extensive margin suggests that
having dissimilar MRL regulations between countries is a ﬁxed cost that producers have to
overcome before being able to export towards a more stringent destination. The same eﬀect
at the intensive margin suggests that the costs of complying with diﬀerent MRL regulations
is variable and increases with the value of exports. Literature suggests that harmonization
initiatives aﬀect both ﬁxed and variable costs (Baldwin et al., 2000; Chen and Mattoo, 2008).
On the other hand, the positive eﬀect of standards could be due to an increased demand in
the destination market thanks to the positive signalling of strict standards, or due to more
eﬃcient and productive techniques used in markets where regulations are stricter4. We thus
examine the potential asymmetric impact of regulatory heterogeneity between exports from
stringent countries and imports into stringent ones.
A few cases must be noted. Not all countries set MRLs for the same pesticide/crop combi-
nation; it can therefore be the case that the importer country sets an MRL for a k, p pair
for which the exporting country has not set a limit and we would therefore have to drop this
observation as no comparison is possible. To minimize this from happening, and without
imputing values arbitrarily, we resort to default MRL values5. Some countries set default
MRLs for any k, p combination that is not explicitly cited in their MRL regulation, such as
the EU that sets an MRL of 0.01 mg/kg for any pesticide on any crop that is not listed in the
European Commission Regulation No 396/2005. Another example is Egypt since it has three
levels of "default": if no national MRL exists, the Codex MRL for the same crop-pesticide
applies, if that is also missing, then the EU harmonized MRL holds, and ﬁnally if even that
is missing, the default 0.01 mg/kg applies.
4Xiong and Beghin (2012) ﬁnd that Canadian exports beneﬁt from having MRL regulation stricter than
the international standard, Codex. Portugal-Perez (2012) et al. also ﬁnd this result for exports from China.
5Drogué and DeMaria (2012) also resort to default values, and to the best of our knoweldge they are the
only ones doing so apart from us.
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Table 1 summarizes the pertinent default MRL cases. Thus, in cases where one of the partner
countries was missing the MRL, we resort to the missing country's default value (if any) to
compute the heterogeneity index. If the importer has an MRL and the exporter does not,
and has no default MRL in place either, we impute fijpkt = 1 and mijpkt = 0
6. We in fact
assume that the exporter is being more lenient since not only does it have no regulation, but
no default one either7.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Just as in Achterbosh et. al. (2009), we proceed to aggregating the index for each product
by constructing the following, where K is the total number of pesticides for which there is
an MRL on product p:
Fijpt =
1
K
K∑
k=1
fijpkt (4)
Mijpt =
1
K
K∑
k=1
mijpkt (5)
4 Estimating trade ﬂows
Our empirical analysis is conducted in the framework of the gravity model as laid down by
Anderson (1979) which is based on identical consumer preferences modelled by Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility functions and with Armington assumption of pref-
erence for domestically produced goods. Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the
value of exports from country j to country i of product p can be written as follows:
Xpij =
Epi Y
p
j
Y p
(
T pij
P pi Π
p
j
)(1−σp)
, (6)
6We impute fijpkt = 0 and mijpkt = −1 when the importer is missing an MRL that the exporter has set.
7Winchester et al. (2012) also assume that the lack of regulation that exists elsewhere is considered to
be less stringent a regulation. Drogué and DeMaria (2012) also assume that the lack of MRL is due to
the exemption of the substance-product combination by the country and thus they arbitrarily impute the
missing MRL with 75 mg/kg, a level that corresponds to the highest MRL in their dataset. Ferro et al.
(2013) replace missing MRLs with the maximum MRL for the concerned product across countries in their
sample at any point of time. Thus, they also associate absence of regulation to leniency.
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where Xpij denotes the value of exports, E
p
i are the expenditure in the destination country
i of product p, Y pj denotes the total sales of exporter j towards all destinations, Y
p is the
total world output of product p, Tij are the iceberg transport costs and σ
p is the elasticity
of substitution across products. Multilateral Resistance Terms (MRTs) are the inward and
outward relative resistance of a country's exports towards all destinations and from all
origins and are represented by P pi and Π
p
j
8. Because these terms are diﬃcult to construct
directly as national price indices are needed, applications of the gravity model have resorted
to using dummy variables to control for them instead. At the sectoral level, time-varying
importer-product and exporter-product ﬁxed eﬀects control for the MRTs (Anderson and
Yotov, 2012).
We proxy transport costs by bilateral distance between trading partners, ln(Distij), as well
as the usual gravity model controls which include dummy variables identifying whether
the trading partners share a border, Contigij, had a colonial relationship, Colonyij, share
a common language, ComLangij, and whether they were ever part of the same country,
Smctryij.
Introducing tariﬀs, τijpt, membership of trade agreements, PTAijt, and our variables of
interest, Fijpt and Mijpt as additional determinants of trade, substituting the MRTs with the
appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects, adding the proxies for transport costs and taking the logarithm of
this transformed version of equation (6) yields the following9:
ln(Xijpt) = β1Fijpt + β2Mijpt +β3ln(1+τijpt) + β4ln(Distij) + β5Contigij + β6ComLangij+
β7Smctryij + β8PTAijt +µipt +µjpt + ijpt (7)
where µipt and µjpt are the ﬁxed eﬀects that proxy the MRTs.
4.1 Estimation issues
Estimating equation (7) using an OLS estimator would result in biased results due to the
large frequency of zeroes in the dependent variable, Xijpt. This is because even if the model
allows for all countries to export everywhere, this is obviously not the case, especially when
dealing with product-level bilateral trade data as in our case. In fact, in the agricultural
trade sample we focus on, Xijpt is equal to 0 in 86% of all observations (details in sub-section
4.2). Dropping the observations with zero trade would bias the results and thus we turn to
8The MRTs are derived theoretically in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
9The notation, regarding the subscripts, is slightly modiﬁed hereinafter to accommodate the time dimen-
sion, t.
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the Heckman two-step estimation method proposed by Helpman et al. (2008) which involves
controlling for the probability of the export-line ijpt to be non-zero before estimating the
coeﬃcients of equation (7)10.
The Heckman two-step estimation involves running a Probit in stage one (selection equa-
tion), with a dichotomous variable identifying non-zero exports between country i and j of
product p at time t as dependent variable, and our MRL heterogeneity indices along with
the standard controls explained above. From this ﬁrst step estimation or selection equation,
we construct the Inverse Mills Ratio11 (IMR), η(xβˆ), from the ﬁtted values of our dependent
variable. By including η(xβˆ) in the outcome equation (7), ηijpt, we eﬀectively control for
the probability of having positive trade ﬂows (Helpman et al., 2008). In other words, we
correct for the selection bias that would have been present in our coeﬃcients had we dropped
observations with zero trade.
Stage two of the Heckman (outcome equation) is an OLS with the natural logarithm of
exports as dependent variable on the same set of control variables as in stage one with
the exclusion of at least one variable that should ideally aﬀect trade only at the extensive
margin12. In the spirit of Chen and Mattoo (2008), our selection variable is a dummy
identifying whether exports were non-zero ﬁve years ago13. Araujo et al. (2012) however
question the validity of this variable as an exclusion condition as they ﬁnd that exporters
will trade larger amounts and for longer periods of time with partners with whom they
have already had a successful match because the quality of the institutions that enforce
commercial contracts is revealed to exporters. Our sample, however, makes this issue less
important since most of the importers in our sample are developed countries and exporters
have a clear idea of the type of contractual enforcement they will ﬁnd in the importing
country.
The use of ﬁxed eﬀects in Probit estimations has come under intense scrutiny due to the
10We could not resort to the Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) due to the very large number of ﬁxed eﬀects ipt and jpt in estimation that led to non-convergence.
11η(xβˆ) = φ(xβˆ)
Φ(xβˆ)
, where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal density function and the standard normal
cumulative function, respectively.
12In order to correctly identify the selection equation of the Heckman estimation, the selection equation
must have additional explanatory variables than the outcome equation. These explanatory variables must
satisfy the criterion that they aﬀect the probability of having positive exports (therefore setting up a trading
relationship) but that once the relationship has been set, the volume/value of exports is not aﬀected.
13Helpman et al. (2008) propose using common religion between trading partners as a proxy for the costs
of regulation as a selection variable in the ﬁrst step. Although the majority of papers use common religion
as an exclusion variable because data on it are easily-collected and Helpman et al. (2008) vouch for it with
country-level data, it is hard to imagine how common religion between two countries can realistically aﬀect
the ﬁxed cost of establishing a trading relationship when using disaggregated product data such as ours. We
therefore use past exporting experience, in the same way that Chen and Mattoo (2008) do. This said, we
also used common religion as a robustness check and found weaker but consistent results.
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problem of incidental parameters. Incidental parameters are nuisance (not of primary in-
terest) parameters whose number increase as the sample size increases14 and which bias
estimates of coeﬃcients derived from non-linear estimations, such as the Probit. Using a
Linear Probability model, estimated with OLS instead of a Probit, when the explanatory
variable matrix contains dummy variables for mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories
is equivalent and yields estimated probabilities within the unit interval15. We do not have a
perfectly saturated model, but as Wooldridge (2010) reiterates, because we care about the
partial eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the response probability on average across the
explanatory variables, then even if some estimated probabilities lie outside the unit inter-
val it is not so important. We therefore resort to the LPM for stage one of the Heckman
estimator.
Formally, we have the following empirical speciﬁcations:
Selection equation:
Pr(Xijpt > 0) = α0 + α1Fijpt + α2Mijpt + α3ln(1 + τijpt) + α4ln(Distij) + α5Contigij +
α6ComLangij + α7Smctryij + α8PTAijt + α9Xijp,t−5 + µipt + µjpt + ijpt
Outcome equation:
ln(Xijpt|Xijpt > 0) = β1Fijpt + β2Mijpt + β3ln(1 + τijpt) + β4ln(Distij) + β5Contigij +
β6ComLangij + β7Smctryij + β8PTAijt + ηijpt + µipt + µjpt + ijpt
Because of the very large number of ﬁxed eﬀects that we include to control for multilateral
resistance terms, we resort to a novel estimation method proposed and coded16 by Guimaraes
and Portugal (2010)17 that makes use of a full GaussSeidel algorithm - the 2WFE estimator.
The main advantage of using this "zig-zag" algorithm is that it reduces the amount of
RAM needed since it partitions the calculation of the OLS estimator18 in a way that avoids
calculating (X ′X)−1 which becomes extremely large when high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects are
included.
Finally, there may be concerns about endogeneity in our estimating equations. In Foletti
(2014), it is argued that the level and stringency of MRLs does not depend solely on scientiﬁc
14Lancaster (2000)
15Wooldridge (2010)
16reg2hdfe in STATA
17Paulo Guimaraes and Pedro Portugal. "A Simple Feasible Alternative Procedure to Estimate Models
with High-Dimensional Fixed Eﬀects", Stata Journal, 10(4), 628-649, 2010.
18βˆ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y
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and health concerns regarding the pesticide but also on economic and political determinants.
In fact, the author ﬁnds strong evidence that agro-chemical industries have an inﬂuence on
the setting of these residue limits since when the pesticide is produced domestically, the
regulation is more lenient. Looking for evidence of protection of agriculture products through
MRLs, Foletti (2014) empirically tests the Protection for Sale (Grossman and Helpman, 1994)
model using MRLs as a proxy for protection instead of tariﬀs. She ﬁnds very weak evidence
for MRL levels being determined by import penetration, thus negating the concern about
the indices Fijpt and Mijpt being endogenous.
4.2 Data
We use data on MRL regulation covering the period between 2006 and 2012 in Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Thai-
land, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, USA and the EU-27 members19. We only include those
countries in our analyses that set MRL regulation independently. The data on MRL regula-
tion were acquired from a private company, Homologa, that updates MRL regulation from
these countries on a monthly basis. The data are intended mainly for agricultural producers
wishing to export their crops.
However, the richness of the data received from Homologa that covers 243 products could not
be fully exploited because a large amount of crops are too speciﬁc compared to Harmonized
System (HS) 6-level data. To enable an empirical trade analysis of these MRLs, it becomes
impossible to use these speciﬁc observations since they would introduce MRL variation within
the HS code that cannot be matched by trade variables. We therefore only keep those crops
speciﬁed in Homologa that were either a perfect match (e.g. avocados are listed separately
in Homologa and have the HS code 080440), broader than the HS 6 category (e.g. Brassicas,
for which we proceeded to apply the MRL to all HS codes that had this description) and
in very few cases, we took the average of no more than two crops listed within the HS code
(e.g. plantains and bananas)20. In view of these limitations, we could only include 118 of
the 243 Homologa products in our analyses.
Creating the indices meant creating comparisons at the pesticide-product level between im-
porters and exporters and a main challenge was the diversely named pesticide active in-
19In our data, EU-27 includes 25 countries because Belgium and Luxembourg are merged into one in the
BACI database and there were no data for Romania
20 These last exceptions were made considering the economic importance of these crops.
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gredients present in cross-country regulation. For this purpose, the names were matched
to their CAS21 number, which is an international nomenclature to identify chemicals. We
matched 1,193 pesticides with their respective CAS number out of the overall 1,426 pesticides
regulated.
We conduct our analyses at the product level, focusing on trade in HS Chapters 7 to 12
over 2006-12 at level 6 of disaggregation; these HS Chapters correspond to the agriculture
and non-processed food sectors where pesticide MRLs are relevant. These sectors accounted
for approximately 17% of the 691 agricultural products included in the WTO Agriculture
Agreement. The list of HS codes is reported in Tables 2 and 3.
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 here>
Export data come from the BACI database, which is constructed from UN COMTRADE
trade data after reconciling exporter and importer declarations and thus expanding the
availability of bilateral trade data. BACI is available at the HS6 level and records exports
per USD thousands, in current prices. The bilateral variables distance, common border and
colonial relationship are also taken from BACI.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4. The full sample has more than 2.4 mn ob-
servations but export value is positive for only 14% of these. For both the full and the
restricted sample (the latter only comprises those countries that actually set MRL regu-
lations or use a default value and for which we do not need to impute values), the mean
value of Fijpt is larger than that ofMijpt (in absolute terms), which suggests that the relative
magnitude of importer stringency exceeds that of exporter stringency. This ﬁnding can also
be explained by our data set, which is dominated by OECD countries, where the MRL values
are typically lower, so that the construction of mijpkt would result in a lot more zero values
compared to that of fijpkt.
<Insert Table 4 here>
The mean values of Fijpt andMijpt by country averaged over 2006-2012 are shown in Figures
2 and 3, respectively. Figure 2 shows that USA, Australia and Japan are the strictest im-
porters (on average) relative to their exporters. Thus, developed countries (USA, Australia,
Japan) exhibit larger magnitudes of relative importer stringency compared to the developing
21Chemical Abstracts Service, a division of the American Chemical Society that has as objective the
collection and organization of information on chemical substances worldwide.
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world (Colombia, Chile, Singapore, India). Figure 3 shows that Mexico, Malaysia, China,
and Taiwan are the four strictest exporters in our sample (on average) relative to their im-
porters. Thus, when it comes to the magnitude of relative exporter stringency (Figure 3),
the distribution is more even - Mexico, Malaysia, China, Taiwan exhibit the largest relative
exporter stringency; Egypt, Argentina, Greece, Portugal show the smallest relative exporter
stringency; and Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Australia, USA, and Japan lie in the middle.
<Insert Figures 2 and 3 here>
Figure 4 shows the average number of pesticides regulated per product in each country at
two points in time (2006, 2012). Figure 4 reveals that developed countries (EU, Switzerland)
regulate a much larger number of pesticides per product and even though there have been
signiﬁcant changes within the overall distribution, the broad picture is fairly constant over
time, with developing countries regulating far fewer pesticides per product. Figure 5, which
shows the average number of products for which MRLs are set in each country (again across
2006, 2012), reveals the same pattern. Thus, developed countries are also far more active in
setting pesticides standards.
<Insert Figures 4 and 5 here>
5 Results and analysis
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the results of the Heckman two-step estimations of our
baseline speciﬁcation. All estimations include time-varying importer-product and exporter-
product ﬁxed eﬀects to control for multilateral resistance. Standard errors are clustered by
trading partner pair.
We ﬁnd that MRL heterogeneity decreases the probability of having positive exports when
the importer is stricter than the exporter implying compliance costs imposed on exporters.
No signiﬁcant eﬀect appears at the intensive margin. On the other hand, greater diﬀerence
of MRLs between trading partners increases the value of exports when the exporters have
to comply with stricter regulations in their domestic market. Thus, stringency in exporter
market is positively correlated with the value of exports. This is a hitherto unexplored result
for as large a sample of exporting and importing countries as ours.
The coeﬃcients on the gravity control variables are consistent with existing gravity estimates.
Countries with a common language or membership of a trade accord or which are adjacent
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to each other have higher probabilities of exporting to each other and also export larger
values. Distance is found to reduce both the probability of trading and the value of trade
between partners. We also ﬁnd higher tariﬀs to reduce exports, both at the intensive and
extensive margins, which is an expected result.
The exclusion variable, Xijp,t−5, in the selection equation and the inverse mills ratio, ηijpt, in
the outcome equation, are both found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
<Insert Table 5 here>
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
We made some assumptions about the data regarding missing MRLs that can be tested by
relaxing the assumptions and running the same econometric analysis as a robustness check.
When constructing the two indices of heterogeneity, Fijpt and Mijpt, we needed data on both
importer and exporter MRLs and when one of them was missing we took various steps to
ensure using the most data possible, without compromising the information in the data. The
ﬁrst assumption was the use of default MRLs to ﬁll in missing MRLs when the country in
question had a known default MRL (like the European Union with a default of MRL equal
to 0.01 mg/kg for any pesticide that is not regulated by the EU). The second assumption
made regarding those MRLs that were still missing was that if the country in question had
no default MRL as well, then not having an MRL was equivalent to being more lenient with
respect to the partner country that did set an MRL.
To test these assumptions and provide a robustness check, while constructing Fijpt andMijpt
we stopped at the ﬁrst assumption, and avoided imputing 1, and -1, for the fijkpt, and mijkpt,
respectively, according to the second assumption. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 show the
results from estimations when using this restricted sample. Although magnitudes of the
coeﬃcients of Fijpt and Mijpt are lower, qualitatively the results are robust to removing the
imputations mentioned above.
Finally, we also estimated our selection and outcome equations for both the full and restricted
samples using an alternative exclusion variable: a dummy identifying whether exports were
non-zero in the preceding year. These results, reported in Table 6, were qualitatively similar
to those reported in Table 5 and even more statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the restricted
sample.
<Insert Table 6 here>
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6 Conclusion
Using two measures of MRL heterogeneity that, departing from existing literature, also
include cases when the exporting country is stricter compared to the importing country, we
have identiﬁed the eﬀect that dissimilarity in MRL regulation can have on bilateral trade.
We ﬁnd some evidence that regulatory heterogeneity in MRL regulation is detrimental to
trade. This result is precisely estimated at the extensive margin when the regulation in
the destination market is stricter. Thus, trade between countries that actively invest in
regulating pesticide residues is hurt by compliance costs of achieving lower levels of residues
to comply with stricter destination-market regulation. This result is in line with the work
of others Drogué and DeMaria (2012), Achterbosch et al. (2009), Burnquist et al. (2011).
A novel result, and a pertinent contribution to the empirical literature on the trade eﬀects of
harmonization of sanitary measures, is the strong evidence that heterogeneity in regulation
is beneﬁcial to exporters setting stricter standards than the trading partner. The result is
robust to changes in the construction of the heterogeneity index.
Having strong heterogeneity in regulations and standards between trading partners induces
additional costs on both exporting ﬁrms and public institutions that have to provide the
support for the exporting sector as well as leading to the use of ﬁnancial resources to negotiate
and resolve probable trade disputes. Our analysis however provides an answer as to why
some countries might prefer to remain relatively stricter than the rest, including international
standards: their exports are boosted by signalling higher-quality more eﬃcient products
emanating from the stricter standards.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the heterogeneity indices
Figure 2: Mean Fijpt
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Figure 3: Mean Mijpt
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Figure 4: Average number of pesticides regulated per product in each country
Figure 5: Average number of products for which MRLs are set in each country
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Table 1: Many countries use Codex MRLs as default values if national regulation is missing
Default MRL information from mrldatabase.com (US FDA) except otherwise stated.
aHealth Canada Information note Information Note: Progress on Minimizing Reliance on the 0.1 Parts per Million as a General
Maximum Residue Limit for Food Pesticide Residue, 2010.
b"When no Limit of Determination is present in the data, we use 0.01 mg/kg as the LOD since it is the most common level at
which pesticides are detected." Pesticide Monitoring Program, 2009 Pesticide Report, US FDA.
cLimit of Determination
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Table 2: Agricultural products included in the sample
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Table 3: Agricultural products included in the sample (contd.)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
The restricted sample includes only those countries that actually set MRL regulation or use a default value so that we do not
need to impute values.
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Table 5: Exporters beneﬁt from regulation heterogeneity when their country sets stricter
standards than the destination country
Columns (3) and (4) use Fijpt and Mijpt constructed only with observations in which both importer and exporter had an
explicit MRL or a default.
#p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001.
Robust standard errors, clustered by importer-exporter pair, included in parantheses.
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Table 6: Qualitatively similar results with a diﬀerent exclusion variable in the selection
equation
The exclusion variable used in the selection equation is a dummy variable indicating non-zero exports in the preceding year.
Columns (3) and (4) use Fijpt and Mijpt constructed only with observations in which both importer and exporter had an
explicit MRL or a default.
#p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001.
Robust standard errors, clustered by importer-exporter pair, included in parantheses.
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